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Ashlee has been working at her current job for almost two years, and she
was confident that she understood her privacy rights as an employee of the
company.1 However, she was completely unaware that one day, by sending a
private e-mail to her private attorney from her work computer, she might
have jeopardized the confidentiality of her conversations that had occurred in
what she thought was strict confidence. 2
Recently, Ashlee had been experiencing some problems with her
supervisor at work, and she feared that his conduct might be amounting to
sexual harassment. Concerned about her safety and her job, Ashlee sought
the advice of a private attorney, who instructed her to keep him informed of
the conduct of her employer. One day at work, Ashlee's employer made a
lewd remark to her about her body and the outfit she was wearing. Upset by
this comment, Ashlee quickly went back to her office and e-mailed her
private attorney from her work-provided computer, giving him a great deal of
personal information, as well as information about her employer's conduct.
In response, her attorney concluded that Ashlee had an actionable claim for
sexual harassment, and Ashlee subsequently filed suit against her employer.
Despite the private nature of the conversation, during discovery for the
pending lawsuit, Ashlee's employer demanded the production of Ashlee's
confidential e-mail exchange with her personal attorney. Although this
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1 "Ashlee" and her accompanying story is a hypothetical situation described to set
up the issue that has occurred in recent cases, to which this Note is addressed.
2 See L. CAMILLE HBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 8A:33.50, at 376 (Supp.
2006) (discussing a new development in the law regarding "[c]laims of waiver of
attorney-client privilege to electronic communications by present and former
employees").
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communication between Ashlee and her attorney appears to be a confidential
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, it is not that
simple. In actuality, the employer, like most employers, had a policy of
monitoring its employees' computer use, and the policy provided that the
employer could monitor e-mail communications at any time.3 In addition,
Ashlee had signed an acknowledgement and receipt of this monitoring policy
when she began working for her employer. The employer claims that, as a
result, Ashlee has waived her attorney-client privilege because she has, in
effect, disclosed the communication to a third party-the employer.4
However, Ashlee's response is that, although there is a monitoring policy
in place, her employer has never before actually monitored employees'
communication. As a result, she claims that she had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in her private e-mail communications with her attorney and thus
they should be protected by the attorney-client privilege. 5 The court in this
dispute is left with the difficult and novel question of what effect employer-
monitoring has on confidential communications between an employee and
his or her private attorney that would otherwise be protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 6 It is this problem that will be addressed in this Note.
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a "technological revolution" in
the workplace as businesses throughout the country have increasingly turned
to computer technology as the primary tool to communicate, conduct
research, and store information. 7 A majority of contemporary employment
settings provide employees with access to e-mail and the Internet.8 The most
3 In today's business world, employer monitoring of employee computer use is
extremely common. See Kesan, infra note 15 at 291 (discussing the substantial number of
employers who currently monitor their employees' computer and e-mail use).
4 These facts are a variation on the facts of Curto v. Medical World
Communications, Inc., No. 03CV6327(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *1-2.
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
5 See id. at *3-4 (discussing whether actual enforcement of computer monitoring
policy should be a factor to consider in the expectation of privacy and waiver of privilege
analysis).
6 This is a new issue that has recently emerged in several cases within the past few
years. See infra Part TV for a discussion on the recent cases addressing this issue.
7 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: COMPUTER USE MONITORING
PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES, 02-717, at 1 (September 2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02717.pdf.
8 Id. at 4 (reporting that as of September 2001, sixty-five million of the 115 million
employed adults age twenty-five and over, almost fifty-seven percent, used a computer at
work). This data is from a study conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) on computer use and monitoring in the workplace. Id. at 2. The GAO conducted
its study by reviewing literature of research on private and public sector monitoring of
employees' use of e-mail, the Internet, and computer files. Id. at 2. Additionally, the
GAO interviewed privacy experts from universities, officials and researchers from
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common use for a computer at work is to access the Internet or use e-mail,
and the percentage of employees using the Internet or e-mail at work grew
from about eighteen percent in 1998 to almost forty-two percent in 2001.9
Computer and Internet use has continued to rise; in October 2003, seventy-
seven million people reported using a computer at work, and approximately
seventy-five percent of those seventy-seven million reported that they used
the computer to browse the Internet or check e-mail. '0
"As the use of these electronic technologies has increased in the
workplace, so have employers' concerns about their employees' use of
company-owned computing systems" such as the Internet and e-mail "for
activities other than company business."' 11 It is no secret that many people
use their work computers for personal use. A recent study estimated that
sixty-one percent of employees who utilize a work-owned Internet
connection admitted that they spend at least some time surfing non-work-
related websites during the work day.1 2 For these employees, approximately
twenty-four percent of their time spent accessing the Internet at work was
found to be non-work-related. 13 As the use of technology in the workplace
increases (and as the potential for abuse also increases), employers are using
national business organizations, and conducted interviews with officials from fourteen
Fortune 1,000 private sector companies from five industry categories. Id.
9 Id. at 4.
10 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Computer and Internet Use at Work Summary, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS (Aug. 10, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ciuaw.
nr0.htm. The seventy-seven million workers using a computer on the job in 2003 was an
increase from sixty-five million in 2001. Id.
11 GAO, supra note 7, at 4.
12 Lexis Nexis Press Release, January 24, 2007, http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/
press-release.aspx?id=0946.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). See also Vivian Marino,
Personal Business: Diary; Confessions of Workers at Play on the Computer, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 15, 2001, § 3, at 10 (confirming "what is already known," a technology-and-ethics
survey in 2001 found that among the 1,130 people it surveyed, two of three admitted that
they were guilty of at least one case of "technology abuse"'-i.e., using a work computer
for personal use-within the past year, while eighty-four percent had witnessed such a
transgression by a co-worker).
13 Websense, Inc., 2006 Web@Work Survey, http://www.websense.com/global/en/
PressRoom/PressReleases/PressReleaseDetail/?Release=0605171215 (last visited Apr.
20, 2008) (finding that of those employees who access non-work-related websites, the
average time spent accessing the Internet at work is 12.81 hours per week, and the
average time accessing non-work related websites at work is 3.06 hours per week). See
also Vivian Marino, supra note 12.
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technology themselves to engage in monitoring and surveillance of their
-employees. 14
Employers' monitoring of their employees' computer use is extremely
common in American businesses. One commentator indicates that at least
.seventy-seven percent of large American businesses monitor electronic
communications that are transmitted through the workplace.15 Moreover, the
amount of information that can be obtained by an employer through
computer monitoring of employees is "staggering."' 16 While the technological
aspects of monitoring are beyond the scope of this Note, in general these
products have tremendous capabilities to monitor employees, such as
showing the online activities of employees, including websites visited and for
how long, as well as allowing employers to monitor the use of chat rooms,
programs run, files used, and e-mail sent and received.17
Given how widespread employee monitoring appears to be, privacy
advocates have raised concerns about the potential for employers to infringe
14 L. CAMILLE HtBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 8A: 1, at 5 (2006) (noting that
"[a]n increasingly common method of electronic monitoring chosen by employers is
monitoring of the work of employees through computers").
15 Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-working or Cyber-shirking?: A First Principles Examination
of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REv. 289, 291 (2002). For other
reports on the prevalence of employer monitoring of computer use, see, e.g., American
Management Association and the E-Policy Institute, 2005 Electronic Monitoring &
Surveillance Survey, http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMS-summary 05.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2008) (reporting a study based on 526 companies found that as many as
seventy-six percent of employers now monitor their employees' computer use); Carl S.
Kaplan, Reconsidering the Privacy of Office Computers, N.Y. TIMES ON-LINE, July 27,
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/27/technology/27CYBERLAW.html (finding
that "up to 14 million U.S. workers are subject to contin[ual] surveillance of their e-mail
and Internet use" while at work); American Management Association, 2003 E-mail Rules
Policies, and Practice Survey, http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/E-
mailPoliciesPractices.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) (reporting that more than fifty
percent of over 1000 companies monitor employee e-mail).
16 HBERT, supra note 14, § 8A:1, at 6. Most relevant to this Note, among the
products developed that can obtain such "staggering" amounts of information are
computer software products that have been developed to monitor employees' use of the
Internet and employer networks. Id.
17 See Rosemary Orthmann, Software Enables Employers to Monitor Employees'
Internet Use, EMP. TESTING L. & POL'Y REP., Apr. 1998, at. 55. See also Gail Lasprogata,
Nancy J. King & Sukanya Pillay, Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring:
Identifying Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative Study
of Data Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada, 2004
STAN. TECH. L. REv. 4, 20-21 (2004) (reporting that software enables employers to
"monitor employees' use of chat rooms, programs run, games played, files used, bytes
transferred or downloaded, time spent downloading, and e-mail sent and received").
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upon employees' right to privacy.18 It is true that many employers have
"developed policies to notify their employees that they monitor use of these
systems and to provide guidance to employees about the appropriate uses of
computing technologies." 19 However, although many companies announce
their monitoring policies ahead of time, it nevertheless appears that employer
monitoring continues to raise many questions about employees' rights to
their privacy.
While an employer's motivation to monitor its employees' computer use
may be completely legitimate, 20 the methods used by employers to achieve
these ends may raise significant privacy issues, to the extent that employers
are monitoring more than simply work activity. By its nature, monitoring of
employees' computer use is likely to stray--either intentionally or
unintentionally-into the realm of private employee activity.21 The use of
electronic monitoring by government employers may violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of employees to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 22 In addition, several cases have been brought by employees
claiming a violation of common-law restrictions on electronic monitoring;
these employees have argued that monitoring constitutes a tort of invasion of
privacy.2 3 As employers continue to monitor their employees, it seems likely
that these types of privacy suits will continue.
In addition to the potential for the traditional constitutional and common
law violations of privacy by employer monitoring, there is a new concern for
the privacy of employees in the technological revolution. It is clear that
employees' use of work-provided computers for personal communications is
18 GAO, supra note 7, at 4 (claiming that "privacy advocates have raised concerns
about the potential for employers to infringe upon employees' right to privacy").
19 Id
20 HIBERT, supra note 14, § 8A:2, at 19 (stating that employers have a right to
reasonably protect themselves from employee theft and other employee misconduct).
21 Id. For example, an employer monitoring Internet use for the legitimate purpose
of assessing productivity may unintentionally discover a personal e-mail communication
that would be considered private employee activity, rather than work-related computer
use.
22 Id. at § 8A:4, 28. The U.S. Supreme Court announced in O'Connor v. Ortega that
manual searches by government employers can implicate the Fourth Amendment when
the areas searched are areas in which employees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id.
23 Id. at § 8A:6, 52. See, e.g., Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. Civ.A.01-3386, 2002
WL 1067442, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (plaintiff-employee claimed invasion of
privacy when employer accessed employee's e-mail); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F.
Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (plaintiff-employee claiming invasion of privacy based on
an employer's monitoring of employee's e-mail); TGB Insurance Services Corp. v.
Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (plaintiff-employee
claimed privacy interest in a computer provided by his employer for his use at home).
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commonplace in today's business world.24  One such personal
communication that may occur is when an employee communicates with his
attorney via e-mail on a work-provided computer. Under other
circumstances, this communication would usually be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 25 However, an emerging issue is how courts will
interpret the scope of attorney-client privilege as it relates to e-mails
exchanged on employer-issued computers that are subject to employer
monitoring. 26 "At stake when an attorney and client communicate [via e-
mail] ... is whether the communication originated in confidence and whether
the parties to the communication have maintained its confidentiality. '27 The
crucial question for employee privacy has become whether workplace
monitoring by an employer may either prevent the employee's e-mail
communication with his attorney from being confidential or may constitute a
waiver of the privilege.28
Part II of this Note will discuss the traditional cases dealing with an
employee's right to privacy in the workplace. Beginning with the U.S.
Supreme Court case O'Connor v. Ortega,29 this section will discuss the
24 See Lexis Nexis, supra note 12 (reporting the increase in computer usage at work,
the article states that "nearly three of four (73% [of]) office workers are either as or more
likely to use the Internet at work for personal reasons than they were two years ago;
sixty-eight percent are as or more likely to send or receive personal emails on their work
accounts"). See also Dion Messer, To: Client@Workplace.com: Privilege at Risk?, 23
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 75, 77 (2004) (discussing a national survey
conducted by the executive director of the E-Policy Institute, which indicates that an
overwhelming ninety percent of employees surveyed nationwide use e-mail at work for
personal business). Moreover, as technology expands, companies are beginning to allow
their employees to work remotely; according to one survey, eighty-one percent of hiring
managers have policies in place that allow employees to work remotely (including
working from home or from a satellite office). See Andrew R. Hickey, A Remote Worker
Can Threaten Network Security, SEARCHNETWORKING.COM, Oct. 11, 2006, http://
searchnetworking.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid7_gci 1222867,00.html.
The increasing number of employees working from outside of the office also leads to the
inference that employees will use these work-provided computers for personal
communications.
25 See PAuL R. RICE, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2:2
at 10 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that when the proponent of the attorney-client privilege has
presented sufficient facts to satisfy each element of the privilege, the communications
between the attorney and client will be protected, and this protection is absolute).
26 See Kelcey Nichols, Hiding Evidence From the Boss: Attorney-Client Privilege
and Company Computers, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 6, 6 (2006).
27 Thomas H. Watkins & Kevin L. Leahy, Avoiding Malpractice at the Speed of
Light.' Are Your Email Communications Protected and Secure?, 68 TEX. B.J. 579, 579
(2005).
28 See discussion infra Parts III, IV, V.
29 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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traditional rule governing employees' privacy, namely, whether the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Part III, the basic
elements of the attorney-client privilege will be discussed. Communicating
via e-mail over a work computer has the potential to disturb two elements of
the privilege: the requirement of keeping the communication in confidence
and the possibility of waiving the privilege. Part IV will discuss the new line
of employee privacy cases that deal with the issue of an employee
communicating with his private attorney via e-mail over a work-provided
computer. Three cases have followed the traditional analysis of the
expectation of privacy cases to determine whether the privilege still exists.
However, one case has held that the expectation of privacy cases are not
controlling in this new context of attorney-client communications. Part IV
will also discuss the reasons the court gives for distinguishing the two sets of
cases.
Finally, Part V proposes a possible new approach to looking at the
employee privacy cases dealing with the attorney-client privilege. First, it is
argued that the attorney-client privilege should be protected. Second, the
Note suggests possible solutions to protect the attorney-client privilege for an
e-mail sent by an employee, even though his employer may have been
monitoring his computer usage. It is proposed that this issue could be
handled by following the novel analysis set forth by the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York in Curto v. Medical World
Communications, Inc.,30 through legislative action such as an amendment to
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 31 through enacting
state legislation, or by the ABA issuing an opinion requiring attorneys to
exercise caution with their clients when communicating via e-mail.
II. TRADITIONAL PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE AND AN EMPLOYEE'S
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The use of e-mail and the Internet in the workplace has significantly
expanded in the last several years, and, as a result, employers are feeling the
need to monitor their employees' use of these devices. There are many
legitimate reasons why employers might want to monitor their employees'
use of e-mail and the Internet. 32 To the extent that employer use of electronic
3 0 No. 03CV6327(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
3118 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-11 (2000).
32 HEBERT, supra note 14, § 8A:2, at 17. Some employers engage in electronic
monitoring as an objective means of evaluating the work performance of employees and
to provide employees with feedback on their performance. Id. at 18. More common
justifications employers give for monitoring employees include preventing employee
theft and the disclosure of confidential information or intellectual property. Id.; see also
2008]
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monitoring actually measures work activity of employees, rather than
personal or private activity, the privacy implications are relatively minor. 33
However, even electronic monitoring that is aimed at recording work activity
may result in the recording of personal, non-work activity by employees. 34
Therefore, although employers may see the monitoring of employee use of e-
mail and the Internet as an effective way to maintain control over the
workplace, this type of monitoring may create legal pitfalls in the form of
privacy invasion. 35
A right of privacy is recognized under both the common law36 and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.37 In both situations, the
aggrieved party must show a reasonable expectation of privacy.38 In order for
a workplace intrusion to constitute a "search or seizure" under the Fourth
Amendment, there must be an intrusion into an individual's "actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy" and that expectation of privacy must be
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 39 Similarly, one
claiming an "intrusion on seclusion," the common law right to privacy
violation, must show, inter alia, a subjective expectation of privacy and that
FREDERICK S. LANE III, THE NAKED EMPLOYEE: How TECHNOLOGY IS COMPROMISING
WORKPLACE PRIVACY 12 (2003) (noting that one of the most important justifications
given by employers of monitoring employees is minimizing theft and sabotage by
employees). In addition, monitoring employees is justified because improper, non job-
related use of the Internet and use of e-mail for personal messages cause a decrease in
employee productivity, and personal messages of an offensive nature can expose
employers to liability for harassment or discrimination. Louise A. Fernandez, Privacy in
the Workplace, 696 PRACTISING L. INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 275, 278 (Oct.-Nov. 2003).
33 HtBERT, supra note 14, § 8A:2, at 17.
34 Id.
35 Fernandez, supra note 32, at 278.
36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1997) (discussing the tort of
"intrusion upon seclusion").
37 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." Id. Because this Note deals with the implications of the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, it applies only to employees working for state actors, as that
is the only category of workers protected by the Amendment.
38 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("[T]he application of the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim
a.. . 'reasonable ... expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government
action."); Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir. 2004) (plaintiff asserting
cause of action for invasion of privacy under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B must
show a "reasonable expectation of privacy").
39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the expectation is objectively reasonable. 40 The U.S. Supreme Court first
applied Fourth Amendment principles to employee privacy in its landmark
case of O'Connor v. Ortega, where it made clear that manual searches by
government employers can implicate the Fourth Amendment when the areas
searched are areas in which employees have a reasonable expectation of'
privacy.4 1 While Ortega dealt with personal effects found in an employee's
office, the same principles have been expanded to deal with employees'
expectations of privacy in computer files and e-mail.
A. The Supreme Court's Seminal Case: O'Connor v. Ortega
In Ortega, a state hospital commenced an investigation into suspected
improprieties by its chief of professional education (Ortega); in the course of
the investigation, hospital personnel searched Ortega's office without his
knowledge or consent.42 In the search, the hospital personnel found evidence
that was subsequently used to impeach the credibility of a witness testifying
on Ortega's behalf and private patient billing information.43 After its
investigation of the alleged improprieties, the hospital fired Ortega.44
Following his discharge, Ortega commenced a federal action alleging that the
search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment. 45
The Supreme Court held that although some hospital personnel may have
had a legitimate right of access to his office, Ortega had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets. 46 The Supreme Court
emphasized that an employee's expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and
files "may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or
by legitimate regulation." 47 However, in this case, "there was no evidence
that the Hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy
discouraging employees such as Dr. Ortega from storing personal papers and
effects in their desks or file cabinets... although the absence of such a
40 See Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812-13
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that to prevail, the plaintiff must show "(a) an actual, subjective
expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or matter, and (b) that the
expectation was objectively reasonable").
41 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
4 2 Id. at 713.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 712-713.
45 Id at 714.
46 Id. at 718-719 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in this area because
Ortega did not share his desk and file cabinets with other employees, he had occupied the
same office for seventeen years, and he kept personal items and records in his office).
47 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
policy does not create an expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise
exist."48 Importantly, the Court stated that "[g]iven the great variety of work
environments ... the question whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis."49
B. Beyond Ortega: An Employee s Expectation of Privacy in Computer
Files and E-mails
Although Ortega dealt with personal effects found in desks and file
cabinets, the same considerations that the Supreme Court espoused in Ortega
have been adopted to measure an employee's expectation of privacy in his
computer files and e-mail. 50 In general, to measure an employee's
expectation of privacy in computer files and e-mail, courts generally consider
four factors: (1) whether his employer maintains a policy banning personal or
other objectionable use, 51 (2) whether the company monitors the use of the
employee's computer or e-mail, (3) whether third parties have a right of
access to the computer or e-mails, 52 and (4) whether the employer notified
the employee, or whether the employee was aware of the use and monitoring
policies. 53 Several courts have applied these four factors to determine
whether an employee's privacy rights had been violated by an employer's
monitoring of e-mail and Internet use.
In United States v. Simons, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a government employee has a
48 Id. at 719.
49 Id. at 718.
50 See Muick v. Glenayre Elec., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002); Leventhal v.
Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th
Cir. 2000); Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467, 2004 WL 2066746, at *20 (D.
Or. Sept. 15, 2004).
51 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) generally prohibits
unauthorized access to or retrieval of a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage or transit. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-11 (2000). However,
consent is a defense to a claim under these statutes; if one of the parties to the
communication has given consent to its interception, there has been no violation of the
Act. See id. Therefore, it is relevant whether the employer maintains a policy banning
non-work related use of the Internet and whether the employee is aware of such policy.
52 An employee may take precautions to limit access; for example, computers can be
password-protected, and e-mails can be encrypted.
53 In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)




reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his use of the Internet.54 In
addressing the reasonableness of the defendant's expectations of privacy in
his Internet use, the court noted that the employer had a policy restricting
Internet use to official business use and indicating that audits of Internet use
would be conducted. 55 In light of this policy, the court held that the
defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his
Internet use, and therefore that no Fourth Amendment violation had
occurred. 56 The court found that Simons could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in files downloaded from the Internet in light of the
existence of the policy, as any subjective expectation of Simons that his
Internet use would remain private "was not objectively reasonable after [his
employer] notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use."57
Several courts have also found that employees have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail that is sent over a work computer.58 In
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail an employee sent to a
supervisor over the company e-mail system, even though the employer made
assurances that such communications would not be intercepted by
management or used as grounds for reprimands. 59 The court found that
"[o]nce [the] plaintiff communicated the alleged unprofessional comments to
a second person ... over an e-mail system which was apparently utilized by
the entire company, any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost."60
54 United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2000). In Simons, the
employee was an electronic engineer employed by the CIA who had access to the Internet
through a government-provided computer network. Id. at 395. The systems analyst
discovered the defendant had downloaded pornographic material from the Internet to his
work computer. See id. at 396.
55 Id. at 395-96.
56 Id. at 399-401.
57 Id. at 398-99.
58 See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100-101 (E.D. Pa. 1996). See also
Bohach v. Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234-35 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that employees
did not have objectively reasonable expectations of privacy in electronic communications
on the employer's computer network); United States v. Monroe, 50 M.J. 550, 558 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (finding that the accused could have no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the e-mail system maintained by the government because that
system was stated to be "for official business only" and notice was given that the "system
was subject to monitoring"); McClaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999
WL 339015, at *4-5 (Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999) (finding that even though plaintiff
created a personal password for his e-mail account, plaintiff still did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the e-mail messages he sent over his
work computer).
59 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
60 Id.
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However, other courts have found that public sector employees do have
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that their e-mail messages
will not be routinely accessed.6 1 In United States v. Slanina, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his computer files where the computer was
maintained in a closed, locked office, the employee had installed passwords
to limit access, and the employer "did not disseminate any policy that
prevented the storage of personal information on city computers and also did
not inform its employees that computer usage and Internet access would be
monitored. '62 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
found that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in private
computer files, despite a warning that there shall be no expectation of privacy
in using the employer's computer system. 63 A reasonable expectation of
privacy was found because employees were allowed to use computers for
private communications, were advised that unauthorized access to users' e-
mail was prohibited, were given passwords to prevent access by others, and
no evidence was offered to show that the employer ever monitored private
files or employee e-mails. 64
It is clear that balancing the four factors, courts have come out with
different results on employees' claims of privacy violations, both under the
Fourth Amendment and common law. Although the courts are mixed, to the
extent that employer computer monitoring reveals non-work-related
information about an employee, a court may find an intrusion upon
objectively reasonable expectations of privacy sufficient to implicate the
protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 65
III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED
BY E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS BY COMPUTER-MONITORED EMPLOYEES
A. The Growing Use of E-mailfor Attorney-Client Communications
E-mail, with its speed of communication and ease of access, has become
an essential tool in today's business world, and law firms are among the
businesses increasingly turning to e-mail to communicate. One of the most
61 See, e.g., United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676-77 (5th Cir. 2002); Haynes
v. Office of the Attorney Gen. Phil Kline, et al., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161--62 (D. Kan.
2003).
62 Slanina, 283 F.3d at 676-77.
63 Haynes, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62.
64 1d.
65 HEBERT, supra note 14, § 8A:6, at 52.
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efficient means for attorneys to communicate with clients is via e-mail, and
e-mail is increasingly replacing phone calls as the preferred method of
communication between attorneys and clients.66 Moreover, attorneys have
endorsed e-mail technology, and the American Bar Association (ABA) has
approved this method of communication as well.67 The use of e-mail among
attorneys is widespread; a 2002 survey revealed that eighty percent of
attorneys use e-mail one or more times per day, and an additional eleven
percent use e-mail one to four times per week.68 Clearly, e-mail is a vital part
of many attorneys' legal communications.
However, the use of e-mail communications between attorneys and
clients poses new problems in today's technological business world.
Complex privacy and confidentiality issues arise because e-mail
communications between attorneys and clients may end up in the clients'
employers' hands due to the growing phenomenon of workplace monitoring
of employees' computer use.69 Problems of confidentiality in the context of
attorney-client e-mails are becoming a serious issue for attorneys and clients,
as personal use of computers at work is widespread.70 As employees
increasingly use e-mail at work for personal communications, it is likely that
an employee involved in a legal dispute will use e-mail to communicate with
his attorney about the ongoing issues. Given the prevalence of employers
66 Messer, supra note 24, at 75.
67 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fo99-413.html (discussing the subject of
protecting the confidentiality of unencrypted e-mails). The ABA responded to varied
state opinions on the use of e-mail for attorney-client communications by adopting its
official position of a full endorsement of the use of ordinary e-mail for professional legal
communication:
A lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct... because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable
expectation of privacy from a technological and legal standpoint. The same privacy
accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and
facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail.
Id.
68 Kathryn A. Thompson, Technology Snapshot: The Results are In, ABA LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.lawtechnology.org/
presentations/techshow2003/techshow2003_files/frame.htm (slide 25) (additionally
finding that only three percent of attorneys reported never using e-mail to communicate
with clients).
69 Messer, supra note 24, at 76.
70 See supra Part I (discussing the high instance of employees using their work
computers for personal use).
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monitoring the computer use of employees, 71 the issue has arisen as to the
effect of workplace monitoring on the attorney-client privilege that might
otherwise protect the confidential communications.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege: What is it?
The attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule that is designed to
encourage the free flow of information between an attorney and his or her
client by protecting that information by keeping the communications
confidential. 72 However, the mere fact that an individual communicates with
an attorney does not make his communications privileged. 73 Before a
communication from a client to an attorney may qualify for the attorney-
client privilege, it must satisfy a number of elements. Generally, most
jurisdictions follow the common law of privilege, and many courts follow a
variation of Professor Wigmore's eight elements that must be met for a
communication to be privileged. Professor Wigmore's attorney-client
privilege consists of:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 74
This is closely mirrored by Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(b),
which, although never adopted, is frequently cited with approval. 75
71 See supra Part I (discussing the prevalence of workplace monitoring of employee
computer use).
72 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING
CONFIDENTIALITY 2 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., American Bar Association 3d ed. 2004)
(1993). "The underlying assumption is that our legal system is more civilized and
efficient because we recognize the attorney-client privilege." Id.
73 RICE, supra note 25, § 2:1 at 6. See also United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465,
468 (1980) ("[I]t is true that '[a] communication is not privileged simply because it is
made by or to a person that happens to be a lawyer.')
74 RICE, supra note 25, § 2:1 at 8.
75 Id. at 8-9. Proposed Federal Rule 503(b) provides:
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, (1)
between himself or his representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's
representative, (3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter
of common interest, (4) between representatives of the client or between the client
and a representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client.
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Accordingly, one of the central requirements of the attorney-client
privilege is that the communication must be made confidentially. 76 An
important component of the confidentiality requirement is that the
communication may not be subsequently disclosed, as disclosure to a third
party generally constitutes a waiver of the privilege. 77
When the proponent of the privilege has presented sufficient facts to
satisfy each element, the communications between the attorney and client
will be protected. Assuming a limited number of exceptions (including
waiver of the privilege) are not applicable, 78 this protection is absolute.79 "It
is believed that the protection must be absolute in order to further the
privilege's end-encouraging candor and full disclosure by the client. '80
Therefore, if all elements of the privilege are met, the privilege precludes the
disclosure of the communications regardless of the need that could be
demonstrated for the information in them.81
C. The Problems Threatening the Attorney-Client Privilege When an
Employee Communicates with His or Her Attorney Through E-Mail on
a Work Computer
When an attorney and client communicate through e-mail over the
Internet, two elements of the attorney-client privilege are at stake: whether
the communication originated in confidence and whether the parties to the
communication have maintained its confidentiality. 82 If a communication
fails to meet either of these two elements, it will not be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 83
Id. at 9-10.
76 Nichols, supra note 26, at 6.
77 Id. at 10.
78 Other exceptions to the attorney-client privilege include the crime/fraud
exception, the joint client exception, exceptions for actions by individuals to whom a
fiduciary duty is owed, the will contest exception, and the open or public meeting
exception (Sunshine Laws). See generally RICE, supra note 24, § 8, at 7-139.
79 RICE, supra note 25 § 2:2, at 10.
80 Id. § 2:2, at 10-11. If the protection were not absolute, the protection would not
be predictable; in response the client could not rely on it and the client's full disclosure
might be "chilled." ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note 72, at 2.
81 RICE, supra note 25 § 2:2, at 11.
82 Watkins, supra note 27, at 579. The second element, "whether the parties to the
communication have maintained its confidentiality" constitutes a waiver of the privilege.
83 See RICE, supra note 25 § 2:1, at 8.
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1. Lack of Confidentiality to Make Out a
Prima Facie Case of Privilege
For the attorney-client privilege to attach to a communication, "a
communication must be made in confidence of the relationship and under
circumstances from which it may reasonably be presumed that it will remain
in. confidence." 84  The attorney-client privilege maintains a strict
confidentiality requirement, and two elements must be met for the
communication to originate in confidence. 85 The first is a subjective element;
the client must intend his communications with his attorney be confidential.86
The second is an objective element; the client's subjective intention of
confidentiality must be reasonable under the circumstances. 87 The subjective
and objective elements are closely related factual questions, and so are often
determined by courts using similar factors. 88
Therefore, in order to qualify as privileged, there must be a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail communications. 89 If there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the communication, then it will not be confidential
and no privilege will attach in the first place.90 It is a hallmark of the
attorney-client privilege that "'[t]he moment the confidence
ceases' . . . 'privilege ceases."' 91 If there are third parties present during the
communication, the communication is not confidential unless those third
84 Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 943 (1956). See also, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that the attorney-client privilege "requires a showing that the
communication in question was given in confidence and that the client reasonably
understood it to be so given"); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981)
("A communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege ... if it is intended to
remain confidential.., and understood to be confidential.").
85 RICE, supra note 25, § 2:1, at 7.
86 Id.
87 Id. §6:1 at8.
88 Id. The most important of these factors is the circumstances surrounding the
communication. Id, at 8-9.
89 Lucy Schlauch Leonard, Comment, The High-Tech Legal Practice: Attorney-
Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 851, 863 (1998).
90 See id. at 864 ("[T]he privilege does not apply to the situation where it is the
intention or understanding of the client that the communication is to be made known to
others.") (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984)).
91 United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that a
communication between an attorney and a client is not confidential when the expectation




parties are necessary to the communication. 92 This creates a potential danger
for the confidentiality requirement if clients communicate with their
attorneys via e-mail while on a work computer that is being monitored.93 If
the employer's monitoring of employees' e-mail use means the employer is
"present" during the communication (because they are monitoring the
content of the e-mail) and the employer is not a necessary party to the
communication (which they often will not be in an employee's private legal
dispute), then the communication will not be "confidential" and therefore
will not be protected by the privilege. 94
In addition, the attorney-client privilege does not apply if the client
understands that the information will be made known to third parties.95
Therefore, if the employer has a policy of monitoring its employees and the
employee is aware of the policy, the attorney-client privilege may not apply
because the employee "understand[s] . . . that the communication is to be
made known to others."96
When dealing with whether an employee understands that the
communication will be made known to others, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") is important.97 The ECPA
generally provides legal protection for intercepted e-mail. 98 The ECPA
makes the interception of an e-mail message by a third party a criminal act
and protects the privilege afforded any illegally intercepted message; an
individual violates the statute if he or she "intentionally intercepts, endeavors
to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
92 Leonard, supra note 89, at 863. See also United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d
237, 237 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the attomey-client privilege extends to
communications with an accountant assisting an attorney in defense of the client where
the attorney directed the client to speak freely with the accountant); United States v.
Evans, 954 F. Supp. 165, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding there could be no privilege for
communications between an attorney and client when an attorney friend of the client was
also present); State v. Colton, 384 A.2d 343, 345-46 (Conn. 1977) (finding there could
be no attorney-client privilege in a conversation between a witness and an investigator
when a third party representing the defendant was also present).
93 Leonard, supra note 89, at 862 (suggesting that the issue of whether the
communication was made in confidence presents potential problems for e-mail and
attorney-client privilege).
94 This danger to the confidentiality requirement is particularly imminent where the
dispute is not one involving the employer, as it is less likely that the employer will be
perceived as a necessary party to the communication.
95 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding
that the privilege does not apply to the situation "where it is the intention or
understanding of the client that the communication is to be made known to others").
9 6 Id. at 1356.
97 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
9 8 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
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intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication." 99 Thus, an attorney
can usually rely on the ECPA to protect the attorney-client privilege of
illegally intercepted e-mail. 100
However, workplace monitoring often falls under an exception to the
statute, as an employer may legally monitor employees' e-mail and Internet
use if it obtains the prior consent of the employee.' 0 ' When an employee
signs an employment agreement that allows his employer to own and monitor
e-mail, he may be giving up the statutory privacy protection afforded to him
under the ECPA. l0 2 Under these circumstances, employer interception of the
e-mail is no longer "in accordance with" or "in violation of' the ECPA, and
the communication may lose the immunity from discovery afforded by
§ 2517(4).103 Therefore, if the employee is aware of his employer's computer
monitoring policy, that knowledge could prevent the communication from
originating in confidence, and the attorney-client privilege would not
apply. 1
04
Other commentators who have discussed the attorney-client privilege in
the context of e-mail and the Internet are also skeptical about the existence of
privacy expectations.'0 5 This skepticism is fueled by security problems with
99 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a) (2000).
100 See Messer, supra note 24, at 91. This statutory protection is outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 2515 (2007), titled "Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral
communications," which provides that "no part of the contents of such communication
and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence."
101 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)(2007) ("It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a
person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception ... ."). Courts
will uphold the consent defense if the employee's consent is found to be either express or
implied. See Mark J. Manta, Electronic Surveillance and Employee Privacy in the
Workplace, METROPOLrrAN CORP. COuNs., June 1996, available at
www.theelawfirm.com/articles.php ("The ECPA allows the interception of electronic
communications where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent,
express or implied, to such an interception.").
102 Messer, supra note 24 at *92. See also Kevin J. Baum, Comment, E-Mail in the
Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1011, 1027 (1997) ("By proving
implied consent through a well-disseminated e-mail policy, the likelihood of an
employer's liability is decreased.").
103 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (2000).
104 Some courts treat consent to employer monitoring under the ECPA as a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege, rather than from preventing the communication from
being confidential in the first place. Under either analysis, the ECPA would not protect an
employee's attorney-client privilege if the employee had consented to employer
monitoring.
105 See, e.g., William P. Matthews, Comment, Encoded Confidences: Electronic
Mail, the Internet, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 KAN. L. REv. 273, 287 (1996);
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the Internet that include "nearly unrestrained access by system administrators
to e-mail accounts and the interception of e-mail transmissions by third
parties."'10 6 Two commentators, Peter Jarvis and Bradley Tellam, have
addressed the issue by comparing e-mail communications with traditional
modes of attorney-client communications.10 7
Jarvis and Tellam argue that the difficulty in creating confidential
communications over the Internet is not the form of the communication, but
rather the medium's lack of confidentiality.' 0 8 The commentators assert that
"computer communicat[ions] through a 'reputable' commercial e-mail
provider" would satisfy the privilege, and this assertion hinges on the greater
security that "reputable" providers provide. 10 9 However, threats from those
that can intercept or otherwise violate the computer network are the prime
concern, and the serious security risks associated with the Internet pose
threats to the confidentiality of a communication.' 10 Thus, if there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy due to various security risks of the
Internet, then the communication is not "confidential." If the communication
is not confidential, then the attorney-client privilege will not attach.
2. E-mailing from a Work Computer as a Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege
Even if an e-mail communication is found to have originated in
confidence, there is a further problem that may prevent a successful claim of
attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege has the additional
requirement that the confidentiality created must be subsequently
maintained-that is, there must not be a waiver of the privilege.1 11 This
requirement is threatened by workplace monitoring of employees' computer
behavior. Workplace monitoring may constitute a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege if these activities involve the subsequent sharing of the
confidential information with a third party.112
The client can expressly waive the attorney-client privilege, but the client
or attorney may also inadvertently waive the privilege by actions such as
revealing the contents of privileged communications to parties without a
Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, The Internet: New Dangers of Ethics Traps, 56 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 17 (1995).
106 Matthews, supra note 105, at 287.




I11 RICE, supra note 25, § 2:1, at 6-10.
112 Nichols, supra note 26, at 10.
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need to know. 113 A client waives the attorney-client privilege if he discloses
the contents of a privileged communication to anyone who is not an
interested party in the action, and this may be true even if the, disclosure is
inadvertent.114 In some jurisdictions, a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
can result from inadvertence due to the failure by the attorney or the client to
take precautions to keep a communication confidential. 11 5 Thus, if workplace
monitoring is construed as disclosing the contents of a privileged
communication to the employer, even though this disclosure is likely
inadvertent by the employee, it may constitute a waiver of the privilege.1 16
In addition, a client can waive the attorney-client privilege if a third party
is privy to the communication. Thus, in the context of communications over
the Internet, a court could find a waiver of the privilege if an e-mail
communication were accessed by a third party. 117 In this respect, an
employer's monitoring of its employees' e-mail use has implications of
maintaining confidentiality. If an employer's access to its employees' e-mails
means that it is "privy" to the communications, then this constitutes a
disclosure of the communication to a third party, and that communication
may be deemed "waived" and may be used against the employee in litigation.
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that workplace monitoring is
analogous to intentional inclusion to constitute a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. One commentator proposes that if an employee signs a written
contract agreeing that his or her employer can monitor her computer use, that
employer should be considered an "intentional recipient" of any personal e-
mail because the employee agreed to the workplace monitoring. 118 In these
situations, some courts have found that when an employee knows his
employer is monitoring his e-mail, he cannot have an expectation of privacy
113 United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 741 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that a
client can inadvertently waive privilege if a third party overhears a confidential
conversation).
114 Messer, supra note 24, at 92.
115 See, e.g., Texaco P.R. Inc. v. Dep't. of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883 (1st
Cir. 1995) (finding that the waiver of privilege by inadvertent disclosure of documents
also waived the privilege for all other related documents); Alldread v. City of Grenada,
988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no error in district court's decision finding
attorney-client privilege for inadvertently produced materials); Weil v. Inv./Indicators,
Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) ("'Inadvertence' of disclosure
does not as a matter of law prevent the occurrence of the waiver."). See also HEBERT
supp., supra note 2, § 8A:33:50, at 345 ("The privilege is generally not waived by
inadvertence, unless the inadvertence suggests that the possessor of the privilege did not
take steps to maintain the confidentiality of the communications.") (emphasis added).
116 See Leonard, supra note 84, at 867.
117 Leonard, supra note 84, at 869-70.
118 Messer, supra note 23, at 93.
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when he accesses confidential e-mail at work.1 19 Thus, whether a disclosure
is deemed inadvertent or intentional, workplace monitoring has the potential
to create waivers of the attorney-client privilege if a client is communicating
with his attorney while at work.
IV. THE NEW LINE OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY CASES:
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
A new issue arising in the area of employee privacy occurs when an
employee communicates with his private attorney on an employer-owned
computer. 120 Several courts have addressed this issue to determine whether
the communication can still be protected by the attorney-client privilege. 121
An employee's expectation of privacy plays a central role in determining if
attorney-client privilege exists.122 Importantly, an employer's policies
regarding the workplace and computer use may diminish an employee's
expectation of privacy in personal communications sent via e-mail. 123
To date, courts have not developed a bright line approach for
determining when the attorney-client privilege protects communications from
an employer-issued computer. Several courts have treated the traditional
expectation of privacy cases as controlling, balancing the four factors 124 to
determine if the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-
mails to his attorney. 125 However, one court has held that the expectation of
privacy cases are not controlling in the unique context of the attorney-client
119 Id. at94.
120 See HtBERT, supra note 2, § 8A:33:50, at 344-45 ("A number of recent cases
have involved contentions by employers that they are entitled to discover the content of
electronic communications between present and former employees and the employees'
attorneys, on the ground that the attorney-client privilege has been waived with respect to
those communications because those communications are accessible to the employer.").
121 See, e.g., Curto v. Med. World Commc'n, Inc., No. 03CV632, 2006 WL
1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006); Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-cv-
1236(JLL), 2006 WL 1307882 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.,
322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Nat'l Econ. Research Assoc., Inc. v. Evans, No.
04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006). These four cases
deal with both the situation of whether the communication was originally made in
confidence (see infra, Part III.C.1) and whether the attorney-client privilege was
subsequently waived (see infra, Part III.C.2).
122 TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 96 Cal. App. 4th 433,
449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
123 Nichols, supra note 26.
124 See supra Part II for a discussion of the four factors traditionally balanced by
courts.
125 See Nat'l Econ., 2006 WL 2440008; Asia Global, 322 B.R. 247; Kaufman, 2006
WL 1307882.
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privilege and has developed its own approach to handling these types of
employee privacy cases. 126
A. Cases Following the Traditional Expectation of Privacy Cases
1. Communications Made in Confidence
For the attorney-client privilege to attach to a communication, "a
communication must be made in confidence of the relationship and under
circumstances from which it may reasonably be presumed that it will remain
in confidence."'' 27 Recently, the Superior Court of Massachusetts determined
whether the attorney-client privilege attached to a communication made by
an employee to his attorney on a work-provided laptop. 128 In National
Economic Research Associates, Inc. v. Evans, National Economic Research
Associates, Inc. (NERA) moved to compel its former employee Evans to
disclose attorney-client communications between Evans and his private
attorney. 129 The attorney-client communications were conducted by e-mail
over a laptop provided by NERA, but Evans had sent and received e-mails
from his personal, password-protected e-mail account with Yahoo rather than
his NERA e-mail address.130 Each of the attorney-client communications that
were sent or retrieved by Evans with the NERA-issued laptop were stored in
the hard drive of the laptop, and they could be retrieved by a person with
substantial computer expertise.131 When Evans resigned from NERA, NERA
retained a computer forensic expert to search the hard disk of Evans' NERA-
issued laptop. 132 During the forensic search, the expert was able to retrieve
126 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *5.
127 Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 943 (1956).
12 8 Nat'lEcon., 2006 WL 2440008, at *1.
129 Id. at * 1. Before leaving NERA to join his new employer, LECG, Evans
conferred with his private attorney regarding various legal matters concerning his
departure from NERA and the commencement of his employment at LECG. Id.
130 Id. Evans often used the laptop issued to him by NERA to send and retrieve
these e-mails via the Internet.
131 Unknown to Evans, when one accesses information through the Internet from a
private e-mail account, such as an account with Yahoo, "all the information that is
accessed is copied via a 'screen shot' onto a temporary Internet file on that computer's
hard drive." Id. at * 1.
132 Id at *2.
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from the hard disk various attorney-client communications between Evans
and his private attorney. 133
In its motion to compel, NERA argued that the attorney-client privilege
never attached to the communications. 134 Evans' use of his NERA laptop
was governed by the policies set forth in NERA's Policies and Procedures
Manual ("Manual"), which was posted on NERA's Intranet. 135 NERA
contended that the warnings in the Manual provided reasonable notice to
Evans that the hard disk of his laptop belonged to NERA and could be read
by NERA.136 As a result, NERA argued that the e-mailed attorney-client
communications "should not be found to have been made 'in confidence'
because Evans reasonably should have understood that they could be read by
NERA" 137
The court, however, held that the attorney-client communications were in
fact protected by the attorney-client privilege.138  To determine
confidentiality, the court examined the reasonable expectation of privacy that
Evans had in the communications. 139 The court found that the Manual did
133 Nat'l Econ., 2006 WL 2440008, at *2 (stating that all of the material discovered
derived from Evans' Yahoo e-mail account, and none were made on NERA's Intranet or
stored in any document that could be retrieved by Window's Explorer).
134 Id. at *3 (arguing that because Evans should have recognized that the hard disk
on the laptop belonged to NERA and was subject to review by NERA, Evans cannot meet
his burden of establishing that "the communications were made in confidence").
135 Id. The Manual stated:
The personal use of e-mail, the Internet and telephones should be kept to a minimum
for both productivity and financial reasons. All computer resources are the property
of the Company. To the extent permitted by law and any applicable agreements, the
Company may, from time to time and at its discretion, review any information sent
or stored using these resources. Be aware that e-mails are not confidential and the
Company may read them during routine checks.
Id. at *2. The Manual also stated, "NERA does permit the use of Internet
resources ... for personal use provided such use results in personal time savings that can
be (at least partially) applied toward work . Id. at *3.
136 Id. at *3.
137 Nat'l Econ., 2006 WL 2440008, at *3.
138 Id. at *4 (finding that Evans had met the burden of "establishing that a privilege
exists ... if adequate steps have been taken to ensure a document's confidentiality")
(citing Matter of Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. (Bermuda), 681 N.E. 2d
838, 841 (1997)).
139 Id. Discussing Evans' reasonable expectation of privacy, the court noted that an
attorney-client privilege is not confidential and therefore not protected by the attorney-
client privilege if "the communication was made in the presence of a third party who was
not a necessary agent of the attorney or the client." Id. at *3. See also Commonwealth v.
Rosenberg, 573 N.E.2d 949, 954 n.10 (1991) (attorney-client communication not
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not expressly declare that it would monitor the content of Internet
communications. Rather, "it simply declared that NERA would monitor the
Internet sites visited."' 40 More importantly, the court emphasized, the
Manual did not expressly declare, or even implicitly suggest, that NERA
would monitor the content of e-mail communications made from an
employee's personal e-mail account via the Internet whenever those
communications were viewed on a NERA-issued computer. 141 Therefore,
Evans had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications
because the Manual did not warn employees that the employer would
monitor e-mails from a personal account if they were viewed on an
employer-issued computer.142
Furthermore, the court rejected NERA's contention that any reasonable
person "would have known that the hard disk of a computer makes a 'screen
shot' of all it sees, which the computer then stores in a temporary file,
including e-mails retrieved from a private password-protected e-mail account
on the Internet."' 143 The court concluded that since a reasonable person in
Evans' position would not have recognized that e-mail communications with
his private attorney made from a private Internet e-mail account could be
read by NERA simply by examining the hard disk of its laptop, Evans could
not reasonably have understood that these attorney-client communications
could be "overheard" by NERA.144
Thus, the National Economic court relied on the factors traditionally
employed in the privacy cases to determine whether the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications. Finding that Evans
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the employer's manual
did not explicitly declare that it would monitor the content of e-mails sent or
received, the court found the attorney-client communications were protected
by the attorney-client privilege. 145
privileged if the communication was made privately but it was understood that the
information communicated was to be conveyed to others).
140 Nat'l Econ., 2006 WL 2440008, at *3.
141 Id. Nor did NERA warn its employees that the content of such e-mail
communications was stored on the hard disk of a NERA-issued computer and therefore
capable of being read by NERA. Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at *4 ("This Court does not agree that any reasonable person would have
known this information. Certainly, until this motion, this Court did not know of the
routine storing of 'screen shots' from private Internet e-mail accounts on a computer's
hard disk.").
144 Id at *5.
145 See Nat'lEcon., 2006 WL 2440008, at *2-5.
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2. Waiver of Privilege
When the attorney-client privilege is present, the client is the exclusive
holder of the privilege, and the communication will remain privileged, as
long as the client does nothing to waive the privilege. 146 Generally, if the
client discusses or otherwise reveals the communication to a third party, the
communication is no longer protected by the attorney-client privilege. 147
Recently, there have been several cases that have examined the waiver of
attorney-client privilege in the context of an employee's communications
over a work-issued computer.
In In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., the issue was "whether an
employee's use of the company e-mail system to communicate with his
personal attorney destroys the attorney-client ... [privilege] in the e-
mails . ,,."148 The court began with an analysis of the confidentiality of e-
mail communication in general, noting that "[a]lthough e-mail
communication, like any other form of communication, carries the risk of
unauthorized disclosure, the prevailing view is that lawyers and clients may
communicate confidential information through unencrypted e-mail with a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality and privacy."' 149 The court noted
that, consistent with this trend, New York and California have enacted laws
that provide some protection to e-mail communication. 150 Accordingly, the
146 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.6, at
352 (1995).
147 See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir. 1956).
148 In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 BR. 247, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). In
this case, the trustee in bankruptcy moved to compel the production of the e-mail
communications between former officers and employees of the debtor and their private
attorneys in connection with an investigation of those officers, contending that the use of
the employer e-mail system waived any attorney-client privilege that may have otherwise
existed. Id. at 252-55. The case also concerned waiver of the work product and joint
defense privileges in the e-mails; however, these topics are beyond the scope of this Note.
149 Id. at 256 (citing, e.g., N.Y.C. Ass'n. Bar Comm. Prof 1 Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 2000-1, 2000 WL 704689 (2000); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility
Formal Op. 99-413 (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fo99-413.html; N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Eth. Op. 709, 1998 WL 957924 (1998). See
generally Audrey Jordan, Note, Does Unencrypted E-Mail Protect Client
Confidentiality?, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 623, 626 n.25 (2004) (referencing ethical
opinions from twenty-three State bar associations).
150 Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 255. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4548 (McKinney 1999) states that
a privileged communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that
it was sent by e-mail or because persons necessary for the delivery or facilitation of the e-
mail may have access to its content. Accord CAL EvID. CODE § 917(b) (West 2004).
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court concluded that "the transmission of a privileged communication
through unencrypted e-mail does not, without more, destroy the privilege."' 151
Due to the novelty of the issue, the Asia Global court was unable to
locate any decisions discussing the confidentiality of an employee's e-mails
in the context of the attorney-client privilege.1 52 However, the court looked
to case law pertaining to an "employee's expectation of privacy in his office
computer and the company e-mail system" for guidance. 153 The court began
by stating that "as with attorney-client confidentiality, the expectation of
privacy has objective and subjective components.' ' 154 To determine whether
the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court used the
same considerations traditionally used to assess reasonable expectations of
privacy and relied on four factors:
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other
objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the employee's
computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access to the
computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or
was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies? 155
Applying the four factors, the question of privilege comes down to
"whether the intent to communicate in confidence was objectively
151 Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 256.
152 Id.
153 Id. ("The Court's own research has not located any decisions that discuss the
confidentiality of the employee's e-mails in terms of the attorney-client privilege. Several
courts have, however, addressed the analogous question of the employee's expectation of
privacy in his office computer and the company e-mail system. These cases offer
guidance ... ").
154 Id. at 257 ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, the person asserting the right must
demonstrate that he has 'a subjective expectation of privacy ... that society accepts as
objectively reasonable.") (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988)). The
court further explained, "Similarly, one claiming an 'intrusion on seclusion' [under
common law principles] must show... a subjective expectation of privacy and that the
expectation is objectively reasonable." Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 257.
155 Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 257. See also United States v. Slanina v. 283 F.3d 670,
676-77 (5th Cir. 2002); Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002);
Leventhal v. Knapeck, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d. Cir. 2001); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d
392, 398 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2000); Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467, 2004 WL
2066746, at *20 (D. Or. Sept., 15, 2004); Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General, 298
F. Supp. 2d, 1154, 1161-62 (D. Kan. 2003); Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. Civ. A. 01-
3386, 2002 WL 1067442, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002); Garrity v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 00-12143, 2002 WL 974676, at *1-2 (D. Mass. May 7,
2002). See also infra Part II discussion for cases cited by the Asia Global court that
consider these four factors to determine reasonable expectations of privacy.
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reasonable.' 156 The court noted that "[t]here is a close correlation between
the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy and the objective
reasonableness of the intent that a communication between a lawyer and a
client was given in confidence.' 157 Accordingly, the court concluded that
"the objective reasonableness of that intent will depend on the company's e-
mail policies regarding use and monitoring, its access to the e-mail system,
and the notice provided to the employees."' 58 Thus, the Asia Global court
followed the traditional employee privacy law analysis in the context of
attorney-client communications and determined that the privilege is not
waived where the intent to communicate in confidence was objectively
reasonable. 159
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey similarly followed
the traditional privacy law cases in a case concerning an employee
communicating with her personal attorney over a work-provided
computer. 160 In Kaufman v. SunGard Investment System, Kaufman and OSI,
a financial company owned by Kaufnan, initiated suit against SunGard
alleging, among other claims, breach of contract. 161 SunGard then filed an
answer and counterclaim, asserting state law claims against Kaufman based
on the alleged disclosure of SunGard confidential information. 162 Among the
files that SunGard sought to obtain were deleted files that had been
recovered, which consisted of e-mails between Kaufman and her private
attorneys. 163 These e-mails were "sent from and received on SunGard's e-
156 Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 258.
157 Id. at 258-59.
158 Id. at 259 (indicating that if the company had a policy of monitoring e-mail that
was communicated to the officers, the use of the e-mail system was "like placing a copy
of that message in the company files" because anyone with lawful access to the system
could potentially review those e-mails). Ultimately, however, the evidence was equivocal
regarding the existence or notice of company policies banning certain uses or monitoring
employee e-mails. Id. Therefore, the court was unable to determine as a matter of law
whether the employees' use of the company e-mail system to communicate with their
attorneys eliminated any existing attorney-client privilege. Id. at 261.
159 See Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 256-61.
160 Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-cv-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882
(D.N.J. May 10, 2006).
161 Id. at * 1. The breach of contract was in connection with SunGard's acquisition of
OSI's assets and hiring of Kaufman as senior executive. Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. The court categorized the relevant exchanged e-mails into two categories.
The first category was e-mail communications exchanged prior to the closing date
(SunGard's purchase of OSI's assets), which remained on OSI computers after closing
because OSI continued to operate at the same location. The second category was e-mails
between Kaufman and her attorneys after the closing date. Id.
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mail system during Kaufman's employment with SunGard."'164 In her
opposition to the order to show cause, Kaufman asserted that the restored e-
mails were protected by her attorney-client privilege and therefore were not
discoverable.1 65 In opposition, however, SunGard argued that Kaufman had
waived the attorney-client privilege to her confidential communications. 166
The magistrate judge had earlier ruled that all of the communications
were discoverable because Kaufman waived the attorney-client privilege, and
the district court agreed.' 67 With respect to the post-closing attorney-client
communications, 168 the court focused on the reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis that underlies traditional employee privacy in the
workplace. 169 The District Court upheld the magistrate judge's ruling that
"any privilege attached to the [p]ost-[c]losing [c]ommunications was waived
because Kaufman knowingly utilized SunGard's network with the
knowledge that company policy provided that SunGard could search and
monitor email communications at any time. ' 170 The court's reasoning rested
on an expectation of privacy analysis. The court found that Kaufman agreed
to abide by SunGard company property policy' 71 and that all information and
e-mails stored on SunGard's computer systems was SunGard property. In
addition, SunGard's policy also provided that all e-mails were subject to
164 Kaufinan, 2006 WL 1307882, at *1. The e-mails had been sent and received on
laptop computers issued to the plaintiff by the employer during her employment. When
she returned the laptops to the employer, she attempted to delete the messages, but they
were recovered by a computer technician. Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. (arguing that Kaufman waived the attorney-client privilege as to the pre-
closing communications by failing to delete them from the computer and that the
attorney-client privilege with respect to the post-closing communications had been
waived based on SunGard's employment policies governing e-mail communications).
167 Id. at *2.
168 The court initially analyzed the pre-closing communications, applying the rule
that a voluntary disclosure of a privileged communication waives the privilege. Id The
court found that Kaufman "intended to transfer the information by failing to take
reasonable measures to withhold the emails or ensure the confidentiality of the emails at
issue." Kaufman, 2006 WL 1307882, at *3. Accordingly, the court found that Kaufman's
actions were deliberate so as to waive the privilege attached to the documents. Id. To
support this conclusion, the court noted that "the express language of the Acquisition
Agreement as well as the conduct of the parties lead [the magistrate judge] to conclude
that the parties intended for the e-mail communications which took place prior to closing
to be transferred along with other information." Id.
169 See id. at *4. See also infra Part II discussing these cases.
170 Kaufman, 2006 WL 1307882, at *4.
171 Id. (noting that "SunGard's 'Use of Company Property and Services' provided




monitoring. 172 Based on Kaufman's agreement to abide by SunGard's
company policy, the court held that Kaufman had no reasonable expectation
of privacy as to his private communications with his attorney. 
173
The recent cases National Economic, Asia Global, and Kaufman
illustrate the. approach three courts have taken on the issue of an employee
communicating with his private attorney when the employer may have access
to that communication. By following the traditional privacy law cases, 174
these courts focused on whether the employer had a monitoring policy and
whether the employee was aware of such a policy to determine whether the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mail
communications. 175
B. The Expectation of Privacy Cases May Not Be Controlling
Despite several courts analyzing the attorney-client privilege issue by
following the traditional expectation of privacy cases, one recent case
concerning the attorney-client privilege of an employee has not followed that
trend. 176 In Curto v. Medical World Communications, Inc., Plaintiff Curto
was employed by Medical World Communications ("MWC") from August
1995 to October 2003.177 In 1999, Curto signed an acknowledgement of her
receipt and understanding of MWC's "E-mail/Computer Privacy Policy,"
contained within the Employee Handbook, which governed the use of its
computer resources. 178 Beginning in May 2002, Curto worked primarily out
172 Id. The court found that SunGard warned its employees that SunGard "has the
right to access and inspect all electronic systems and physical property belonging to it.
Employees should not expect that any items created with, stored on, or stored within
Company property will remain private. This includes ... computer files and electronic
mail, even if protected with a password." Id. SunGard further notified all employees that
SunGard "reserves the right to monitor and inspect network or Internet usage and e-mail"
and that "any e-mail may be subject to monitoring, search or interception at any time,
with or without notice to the sender or recipient." Id.
173 Id. at *4. The court noted at the end of its opinion that the Plaintiff filed a motion
for reconsideration that was denied. The court therefore did not address Kaufman's
explanation that personal communications with her attorneys were exchanged at the
office out of necessity arising from the long business hours at SunGard. Kaufman, 2006
WL 1307882, at *4.
174 See supra Part I.
175 See Kaufman, 2006 WL 1307882, at *4; Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs., Inc. v.
Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *4 (Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 2006); In re
Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
176 Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
177 Id.
178 Id. at * 1. The policy provided in part:
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
of her home office and was assigned employer-provided laptop computers.179
Before transferring from a Macintosh laptop ("Mac") to a Dell laptop
(''Dell"), Curto deleted her personal files from the Mac, including notes and
e-mails she had sent her personal attorneys regarding the present action. 180
The Mac laptop was then returned to MWC. 181 Curto then used the Dell
laptop in her home office until she was terminated in 2003, at which time she
returned the Dell to MWC. 182
Almost two years later, MWC was able to restore portions of the
computer files and e-mails that had been deleted by Curto. 183 MWC sought
to use the documents in the present action, but Curto's counsel asserted that
many of these documents were protected from disclosure by the attorney-
client privilege. 184 The court thus had to determine whether Curto was
entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege to require the documents to be
returned and not disclosed by defendants.185
In line with several other courts following the expectation of privacy
cases, the defendants argued that "numerous federal courts have held that an
employee has no expectation in workplace computer files
where.., company guidelines and policy explicitly inform the employee that
no expectation of privacy exists." 186 However, in contrast with the courts in
National Economic, Asia Global, and Kaufinan, the Curto court did not
Employees should not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer system .... Employees expressly waive any right
of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer or through
the Internet or any other computer network. Employees consent to allowing
personnel of [MWC] to access and review all materials employees create, store,
send, or receive on the computer or through the Internet or any computer network.
Id.
179 Id. Curto was assigned a Company-owned Macintosh laptop computer ("Mac")
until May 2003, when she was told she would be converting to a Dell laptop computer
("Dell"). As a result, Curto had her files from the Mac transferred to the new Dell.
180 Id.
1811Id.
182 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *1. Before she returned the Dell, she again deleted
all personal files and written communications to private counsel. Id.
183 Id. MWC hired a forensic consultant to inspect the Mac and Dell laptop
computers assigned to Curto; the consultant was able to recover portions of the computer
files and e-mails.
184 Id. at *1.
185 See id. at *2.
186 Id. at *5 (citing Muick v. Glenayre, 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000); Thygeson v. Bancorp, No. CV-03-
467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004) at *18-21; Kelleher v. City of
Reading, No. CIV.A.01-3386, 2002 WL 1067442 at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002)).
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believe that the expectation of privacy cases were controlling.' 87 The court
reasoned that
"[a]ll of [the expectation of privacy cases cited by defendants], however,
arise in the context of an employee asserting a right to privacy claim, either
under the Fourth Amendment or common law. While these cases may be
analogous, they are not controlling as they do not address the confidentiality
of employee's e-mails and personal computer files with regard to the
attorney-client privilege .... "188
Thus, the Curto court found that the traditional expectation of privacy cases
were not controlling in the context of the attorney-client privilege.
The court further explained that not only do the attorney-client privilege
cases arise in a different context, the Curto case was also factually
distinguishable from the traditional expectation of privacy cases in an
important way-none of the expectation of privacy cases involved an
employee working from a home office.' 89 Thus, after reviewing the right to
187 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *5 (declaring that "[t]he [e]xpectation of [p]rivacy
[c]ases are not [c]ontrolling").
188 Id. The court saw it as important to distinguish the different context of cases
dealing with Fourth Amendment or common law privacy claims versus privacy claims
dealing with the attorney-client privilege. Id. For example, it noted that the Second
Circuit had the opportunity to rule on an expectation of privacy case under the Fourth
Amendment in Leventhal v. Knapek. Id. In Leventhal, the Second Circuit stated that in
determining whether a public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office computer, "the context of the employment relation" should be considered. 266
F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987). The
court then found that the plaintiff-employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of his office computer as the employer had neither a general practice of
monitoring nor a policy governing computer usage. Id. The Curto court emphasized that
the Leventhal case is distinguishable because it "involves an employee's right to privacy
under the Fourth Amendment and does not involve the interplay of this right with the
attorney-clientprivilege ..." Curto, 2006 WL 1318387 at *6 (emphasis added).
189 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *5. The court noted that this distinction is
particularly significant in Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746
(D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004). In Thygeson, the court found that the plaintiff-employee had "no
reasonable expectation of privacy" in files he stored in his personal folder on his
computer and in his personal e-mail account because his employer had an "explicit policy
banning personal use of office computers and permitting monitoring," and because the
employer retrieved such information by accessing its own computer network. Thygeson,
2004 WL 2066746, at *21. The court found the employer "retained the key" to plaintiff's
files as it "was able to remotely search [plaintiff's] personal files on the network." Id. at
* 19. However, in the Curto case, Curto's laptops were not connected to MWC's
computer server and were not located in MWC's offices. Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at
*5. Therefore, "MWC was not able to monitor [Curto's] activity on her home-based
laptops or intercept her e-mails at any time." Id. When Curto did have to return her
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privacy cases cited by the defendants, the court did not believe such cases
were controlling. The court emphasized the Supreme Court's instruction in
O'Connor: "Given the great variety of work environments... the question
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be
addressed on a case-by-case basis."'190 In light of these observations, the
Curto court was unwilling to treat the expectation of privacy cases as
controlling in the issue of employee privacy with respect to privileged
attorney-client communications.
V. A NEW WAY TO LOOK AT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY CASES
If the expectation of privacy cases are not controlling (i.e., if the Curto
approach is followed), courts are free to develop their own way to analyze
cases in which an employee communicates with his private attorney on an
employer-owned computer and the employer has access to the
communication. There are several factors to consider to strike an appropriate
balance between protecting employees' rights to privacy and yet allowing
employers to monitor their employees' business activities. Ultimately,
however, courts, legislatures, and ABA officials should strive to protect
employee privacy and the attorney-client privilege. This Part discusses
possible approaches to protecting the privilege through solutions such as
following the Curto court's approach; through legislative enactments such as
an amendment to the ECPA or state legislation; and, finally, through an
American Bar Association requirement of precaution.
laptops, she deleted all personal files. Id. at * 1. Thus, according to the Curio court, it was
reasonable for Curto to believe that the e-mails she sent and the personal documents she
stored on her laptops were confidential. Id. at *5.
The Curio court also distinguished United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir.
2000), factually. See Curio, 2006 WL 1318387, at *6. In Simons, the company's
monitoring policy stated that electronic auditing "shall be implemented" and that "[u]sers
shall ... [u]nderstand [the employer] will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the
user's Internet access as deemed appropriate." Simons, 206 F.3d at 395-96. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that such language "placed employees on notice that they could not
reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private." Id. at 398. In Curio in
contrast, the employer's policy declared: "Employees understand that [MWC] may use
human or automated means to monitor use of computer resources." Curio, 2006 WL
1318387, at *6. The court found that "[n]ot only is the wording in the policy at issue
ambiguous as to whether MWC will conduct audits, because [Curto] worked at home...
any such monitoring would have had to have been preceded by notice to [Curto]."Id.
190 Curio, 2006 WL 1318387 at *6 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718
(1987)). The court further noted that "[a]lthough the instant case involves the
juxtaposition of the right to privacy with the attorney-client privilege ... this instruction
is relevant nonetheless." Curio, 2006 WL 1318387, at *6.
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A. The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Be Protected
There are several reasons given by employers justifying their need to
electronically monitor their employees. 191 It is clear that there are legitimate
reasons for employers to monitor their employees' computer activity, and, as
one author has noted, it seems "very unlikely that employees will be able to
challenge successfully... employer use of computer monitoring of
employees, at least to the extent that what is being monitored is some aspect
of the way that employees perform their jobs."'192 However, to the extent that
the computer monitoring reveals non-work-related information about an
employee, the monitoring no longer seems justified by the employers'
legitimate business justifications. 193 Thus, employers are not necessarily
justified in monitoring non-work-related computer usage, and the privacy of
employees with respect to non-work-related matters, such as their personal
communications with their private attorneys, should be protected.
Moreover, the attorney-client privilege demands protection because it is
extremely important in today's legal landscape. The attorney-client privilege
"may well be the pivotal element of the modern American lawyer's
professional functions."' 194 "The attorney-client privilege ensures candid,
independent, and honest assessments from attorneys by protecting
information exchanges between the attorney and client for the purpose of
securing legal advice."'195 While suppressing certain information shared
between the attorney and client "may prevent the fact-finder from
ascertaining a full and accurate account of the truth," the recognition of the
attorney-client privilege reflects a "societal judgment that this harm is
outweighed by the importance of a client having confidential consultation
191 See supra Part II. For a detailed discussion of employer justifications for use of
electronic monitoring and surveillance, see IIBERT, supra note 2, § 8A:2, at 17-23.
192 HtBERT, supra note 2, § 8A:7, at 52 (emphasis added).
193 Id. at 53.
194 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1061 (1978) (discussing the importance of the attorney-
client privilege and claiming that the privilege "is considered indispensable to the
lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that the advocate can adequately prepare a
case only if the client is free to disclose everything, bad as well as good"). "The privilege
is also considered necessary to the lawyer's function as confidential counselor in law on
the similar theory that the legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do only if
the client is free to make full disclosure." Id.
195 Lisa Plush, A Balanced Approach to Government Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Confirmation Setting, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 907, 910 (2006).
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with his lawyer."' 196 Thus, because the attorney-client privilege is "required
for the attorney to function most effectively," it is imperative that this
privilege be protected.' 97
The attorney-client privilege also faces new threats as employees are
increasingly working outside of the office and working longer hours; as a
result of these new dangers, adequate protection of the privilege is required.
More and more, companies are employing "remote workers," which are
employees who work from home, using a work-provided computer.198
Remote workers have been commonplace in businesses for several years, 199
and the number of remote workers is continually on the rise.200 As the
number of people working from home increases, the number of employees
using their work-related computers for personal use is also on the rise.201 The
personal use of work computers by remote workers has the potential to
increase the problems of keeping attorney-client confidences privileged.20 2
1961d. (reporting that courts acknowledge privileges because their purpose
outweighs the merit of the evidence that would be introduced without the claim of
privilege).
197 Id. at 911.
198 See Hickey, supra note 24.
199 See id.
200 Andrew R. Hickey, Mobile, Remote Workers Putting Strain on IT,
SEARCHNETWORKING.COM, Dec. 12, 2005, http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/
news/article/0,289142,sid4Ogcil151501,00.html. One study predicts that remote
workers in the U.S. alone will reach 103 million by 2008. Id. This is a spike in numbers,
as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that there were twenty-five million
employees working from home at least once a month in 2001. Paula Jacobs, On the Road
Again: Keeping Remote Workers Connected, SearchExchange.com, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://searchexchange.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid43_gci 1003074,00.html.
201 Hickey, supra note 24 (reporting that 30% of remote workers surveyed in the
Cisco study claimed to use their computers for personal matters, while 46% said they buy
personal items using work computers).
202 This scenario mirrors the facts of the Curto case, as the plaintiff in that case was
working from home and the e-mail communications with her private attorney occurred
while she was working remotely on an employer-provided computer.
In addition, in National Economic, the court refused to find that an employee had
waived the attorney-client privilege based on similar concerns about the increasing
popularity of remote workers. See Nat'l Econ. Research Assoc., Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-
2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006). In its conclusion,
the court explained that "a different result would make it very difficult for employees
who travel on business to engage in privileged communications with their attorneys
because they could not use the employer-provided laptop nor any hotel computer,
because the hotel could access the communication stored on its computer. Instead, the
court said, the employee would have to travel with two laptops-the employer's and his
or her own." HtBERT supra note 2, at § 8A:33:50, 381 (discussing the reasoning behind
the decision of the National Economic court).
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Moreover, there is also the emerging issue of personal communications being
exchanged at work due to the necessity of long working hours.203 Given the
expanding forums in which private e-mails may be exchanged on work
computers, it is increasingly important to find ways to protect employees'
confidential communications with their private attorneys.
B. Solutions to the Problem: Possible Ways to Protect Employees'
Private Communications with Their Attorneys
1. Follow the Curto Court's Approach
The Curto court distinguished the situation of an attorney-client
communication from the expectation of privacy cases under the Fourth
Amendment and common law and determined that the expectation of privacy
cases are not controlling in this different context. 204 Embarking on a new
approach, the court noted that it has consistently adopted a middle-of-the-
road approach in determining whether inadvertent disclosure results in a
waiver.205 In this regard, courts have routinely examined four factors in
analyzing whether "the producing party's conduct was so careless as to
suggest that it was not concerned with the [protection] of the asserted
203 See Kaufman v. SunGard Invest. Sys., No. 05-cv-1236(JLL), 2006 WL 1307882,
at *4 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006) (discussing that in a new certificate filed the plaintiff
explained that personal communications with her attorneys were exchanged at the office
out of necessity arising from the long business hours at SunGard). Even though the court
did not address this issue, it demonstrates that long working hours can contribute to
increased personal communications by employees on employer-provided computers.
204 See Curto v. Medical World Communications, Inc., No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL
1318387, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006); see also supra Part III.C.
205 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *4. Courts have taken three different approaches to
inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery: (1) the "lenient approach,"
whereby inadvertent disclosure does not waive the privilege, even with regard to the
disclosed documents; (2) the "strict test," wherein inadvertent disclosure waives the
privilege regardless of the care taken to prevent the disclosure; or (3) the "middle-of-the-
road approach," in which inadvertent disclosure may waive the privilege, depending on
the circumstances, especially the care taken to prevent disclosure of privileged matter and
the existence of prompt efforts to retrieve the document. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Broun &
Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A
Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 220 (2006); Michael
D. Fielding & Jack Seward, You Need to Know This: Bankruptcy and Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Electronic Age, 25-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, *64 (2007). Akin to the
court in Curto, the "middle-of-the-road" approach is the approach taken by many recent
decisions. See Geoff Howard & Andrew Tran, Electronic Discovery Cost Containment
Under the New Federal Rules and Beyond, 747 PRACTISING L. INST., LITIG. 371, 391
(2006).
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privilege." 20 6 The four relevant factors that courts have been called upon to
balance are:
[1] the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the producing party to
prevent inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents; [2] the volume of
discovery versus the extent of the specific disclosure [at] issue; [3] the
length of time taken by the producing party to rectify the disclosure; and [4]
the overarching issue of fairness. 207
In addition to these traditional four factors, however, the Curto court
added a fifth factor to the analysis: "whether or not there was enforcement of
[any computer usage] policy." 20 8 The defendant argued that the lower court
had erred in adopting this factor. The defendant's argument was that the fifth
factor, i.e., "whether or not [defendant] enforced its computer usage policy,"
had not been adopted or followed by any other court, and that this newly
imposed requirement was "contrary to well-settled law."209 The court,
however, rejected the defendant's argument and upheld the use of this
additional factor.210
Because the court was of the view that the right to privacy cases do not
control when factual circumstances involve the interplay of privacy rights
with the attorney-client privilege, it did not view that the existing cases
compelled the conclusion that enforcement may not be a relevant factor.211
Applying the five factors, the court found that the defendant's lack of
206 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *4 (quoting SEC v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
207 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *2. See also Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484
(8th Cir. 1996); Abbott v. Coyle, No. CV 05-5051(ADS)(WDW), 2006 WL 3780550
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2006); Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., No. 03-2200-
JWL-DJW, 2006 WL 1867478 at *9 (D. Kan. July 1, 2006); United States v. Rigas, 281
F. Supp.2d 733, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
208 Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3. The court, in several instances, also categorized
this factor as a "subset" of the first factor, i.e., the reasonableness of the precautions taken
by the plaintiff to prevent inadvertent disclosure. Id. at *5.
209 Id. at *4.
2 10 Id. at *4-5.
211 Id. at *6 (heeding to "the Supreme Court's instruction in O'Connor: '[g]iven the
great variety of work environments, ... the question whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis"'). To
support this conclusion, the court noted that in the Asia Global case, "[a]lthough the
court.., did not explicitly discuss whether the employer actually monitored employees'
computer usage ... it did recognize enforcement as a factor to be considered." Id. at *8.
The Asia Global court considered the first four factors and recognized enforcement as a
factor to be considered, but the evidence was equivocal regarding the existence or notice
of corporate policies banning certain uses or monitoring of emails. Although Asia Global
was not binding on the Curto court, it used it as further support for the consideration of
the additional factor in the privilege analysis. Curio, 2006 WL 1318387, at *7-8.
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enforcement of its computer usage policy created a "false sense of security"
which "'lull[ed]' employees into believing that the policy would not be
enforced. '212 In this sense, the fifth factor works as an additional safeguard
to protect employees' privacy, because even if there is a monitoring policy in
effect, it must further be determined if that policy is actually being enforced.
Based on these findings, the court upheld a ruling that the plaintiff had not
waived her right to assert the attorney-client privilege. 213
Thus, the Curto case implemented a new factor in the traditional analysis
of when inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, which serves to protect the employees' privacy of personal
communications with attorneys from a work computer.214 Other courts could
follow this approach and consider whether the employer in question actually
enforced a monitoring policy in determining whether there was a waiver of
the privilege. This would have the effect of giving the employee increased
privacy rights when dealing with private communications to their attorneys
that occur on employer-owned computers because, if an employee believed
that her communications would remain confidential, the mere existence of a
computer-monitoring policy would not be sufficient to destroy the privilege.
It would further have to be shown that the employer actually enforced such a
policy before there could be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 215
2. Legislative Solutions
As an alternative to judicially-created methods to increase employee
privacy protection for confidential communications with attorneys, both state
and federal lawmakers could attempt to deal with the problem through
legislation. On the federal side, an amendment to the ECPA may be helpful.
At the state level, states could follow lead of New York and California to
enact state legislation to increase the privacy rights of employees in this
unique situation.
212 Id. at *3. The lower court further found that there were only four instances in
which the employer-defendant "monitored the computer use of its employees and that
they occurred under very limited circumstances," such as "when there was a request by
either a manager or supervisor or by someone else." Id.
213 Id. at *9 (upholding the lower court's order finding that the plaintiff did not
waive her attorney-client privilege).
214 See id. at *8-9.
215 See id. at *5.
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a. Amendment to the ECPA
The ECPA makes the interception of an e-mail message by a third party
a criminal act and protects the attorney-client privilege afforded any illegally
intercepted message. 216 However, as discussed earlier,217 workplace
monitoring often falls under an exception to the statute because when an
employee signs an employment agreement that allows his or her employer to
monitor e-mail on employer-owned equipment, the employee gives up the
statutory privacy protection afforded him by the ECPA.218
To increase employee privacy with respect to personal communications
between the employee and his or her attorney, Congress could amend the
ECPA to increase the protection given to privileged communications in
monitored e-mail.2 19 Under the current version of the ECPA, the statute only
protects employees from someone intercepting their e-mail without their
agreement and when employers are not monitoring during the "ordinary
course of business. '220 To protect the privilege, the ECPA could be amended
to provide absolute immunity from a waiver of the privilege so that an
employee's consent under the statute to allow employer computer monitoring
would not waive the privilege. In effect, for electronic communications
qualifying as attorney-client privilege, the amendment would continue to
regard employer interceptions of such communications "in accordance with"
or "in violation of' the provisions of the statute, and thus the
communications would not lose their privileged character. 221
With such an amendment, employers who monitor employees' e-mail for
"legitimate business purposes" would be prohibited from releasing e-mail
between employees and their private attorneys, but the amendment would
still allow employers to monitor the Internet activities of their employees in
search of evidence of theft or other legitimate employee misbehavior. This
amendment would serve both the legitimate business purpose that employers
216 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and (d) (2000). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (2000)
("No otherwise privileged ... electronic communication intercepted in accordance with,
or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.").
217 See supra Part III.C.1.
218 See Messer, supra note 24, at 92. Under these circumstances, employer
interception of the e-mail is no longer "in accordance with" or "in violation of' the ECPA
and loses the immunity from discovery afforded by § 2517(4). Id.
219 See Messer, supra note 24, at 96.
220 The case law discussed in the Messer note "indicates that courts are giving
'ordinary course of business' a very broad interpretation. As a result, the ECPA probably
does not protect any employees in workplace monitoring situations." Messer, supra note
24, at 99 n.175.
221 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994).
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need to fulfill by monitoring e-mail while simultaneously protecting
employees' privileged communications with their private attorneys. 222
If Congress were to enact this change, even if an employee agrees to e-
mail and monitoring as a condition of employment or use of his employer's
computer system, the amendment would protect the confidentiality of his e-
mail.223 Although it is unclear how receptive Congress may be to this
proposed change, it certainly would increase protection for employee's
private e-mails to their attorneys, even if they had agreed to their employer's
monitoring for business-related purposes.
b. State Legislation
The prevailing view of various bar associations is that although e-mail
communication, like any other form of communication, carries the risk of
unauthorized disclosure, lawyers and clients may communicate confidential
information through unencrypted e-mail with a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality and privacy. 224 Consistent with this trend, New York and
California have enacted laws that provide some protection to e-mail
communications. The New York law states that a privileged communication
between an attorney and client does not lose its privileged character for the
sole reason that it was sent by e-mail or because persons necessary for the
222 See HIBERT, supra note 14, § 8A, at 2.
223 Messer, supra note 24, at 97. The author notes, however, that it is unlikely that
"a business-friendly Congress will make such a trespass on the rights of most
employers," as employer monitoring of computer usage is widespread in today's business
world. Id. (citing a study revealing that more than fifty percent of over 1000 companies
surveyed monitor employee e-mail).
224 E.g., ABCNY Comm. on Prof 1 & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. # 2000-1 (2000);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fo99-413.html; NYSBA Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 709,
1998 WL 957924 (1998). In addition, several state ethics committees have also approved
the use of e-mail to transmit confidential communication. See, e.g., D.C. Legal Ethics
Comm. Op. 281 (1998), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/
legal ethics/opinions/281.cfm (no per se rule barring use of unencrypted Internet e-mail
to transmit client confidences); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 281 (1998), available at
http://www.scbar.org/member/opinion.asp?opinionlD=469 (examining the privacy of
Internet communications in view of current technology and laws prohibiting interception
or monitoring of e-mail communications, and concluding that Internet users may have a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality); VBA Advisory Ethics Op. 97-5(1997),
available at https://www.vtbar.org/intus/cms/DisplayPage.asp?PagelD=5 (follow
"Advisory Ethic Opinions" hyperlink, then follow "Confidences of the Client-
Disclosure" hyperlink, then follow "97-05" hyperlink) (e-mail may pose no risk to
confidentiality).
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delivery or facilitation of the e-mail may have access to its content.225 The
California Evidence Code provides for a similar rule.226 Thus, although there
is disagreement, 227 these statutes provide that the transmission of a privileged
communication thorough unencrypted e-mail does not, without more, destroy
the privilege.
To expand the rights of employee privacy with respect to confidential
communications with their lawyers, other states could follow the lead of New
York and California and enact legislation specifically recognizing that the
transmission of privileged communication through e-mail does not
automatically destroy the privilege. 228 Moreover, states could expand even
further to protect the attorney-client privilege by enacting specific statutes to
protect e-mail communications in the unique situation in which an employee
e-mails his attorney from an employer-owned computer. For example, the
California statute could be amended to specifically provide protection of
privileged information not only where a person involved in the "delivery,
facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the
content of the communication," 229 but also where the employer actively
monitors Internet use for business-related purposes. If this amendment was to
be enacted and other states followed this lead, this is another possible way in
which employee privacy could be enhanced.
This option-states adopting statutes similar to New York and
California, or states further extending privacy to employees to cover the
situation where an employee e-mails his private attorney from an employer-
monitored computer-would be a step in the right direction for protecting
employees' privileged communications with their attorneys on work
computers. It would again preserve employers' legitimate business need to
225 N.Y. C. P. L. R. § 4548 (McKinney 1999).
226 CAL. EvID. CODE § 917(b) (West 2007) ("A communication between persons in
[the attorney-client relationship] does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason
that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery,
facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the
communication.").
227 See, e.g., NYSBA Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), 1998 WL 957924, at
*3 (finding that some ethics committees have not clearly approved the use of e-mail for
confidential communications); Az. Op. 97-04 (e-mail may pose a risk to confidentiality);
Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. Of Prof'1 Ethics & Conduct Op. 96-1 (1996), available at
http://www.iowabar.org/ethics.nsf (follow "Iowa Board of Professional Ethics Opinions"
hyperlink, then select Opinion 96-01 by following "08/29/1996" hyperlink) (attorneys
must obtain waiver from clients as to e-mail security risk).
228 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.F.R. § 4548 (McKinney 1999); CAL. EVID. CODE § 917(b)
(West 2007).
229 CAL. EvID. CODE § 917(b) (West 2007).
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monitor employee Internet use, while also allowing employees to retain their
privacy with respect to matters that do not pertain to their work.
3. Requirement of Precaution by Attorneys
In 1999, the ABA issued an opinion taking the position that sending
confidential information through e-mail is no more a violation of the
attorney-client privilege than making a telephone call or sending a facsimile,
and it is not necessary for attorneys to take measures to secure their
communications through encryption or other protective technologies. 230 In
efforts to make employees more aware of the potential risk of
communicating with their attorneys over e-mail in the workplace, it has been
suggested that "[t]he ABA could issue a revised opinion on attorney-client e-
mail communications." 231 The revised opinion could require that "an
attorney warn his client of the risks inherent with confidential e-mail
communications and [prohibit] confidential e-mail transmissions to and from
a client's employer e-mail address." Under this opinion, "[w~hile clients
might still access their personal e-mail from their employers' computers, they
would do so knowing that they might be [putting the confidentiality in
jeopardy or] waiving the privilege." 232 Given this warning, it is possible that
clients "would find alternate ways of accessing their personal e-mail from
their workplace that their employer cannot legally monitor, such as from
their personal cell phones, pagers, or PDAs."233
The value of the ABA issuing a requirement of precaution by attorneys
would provide enhanced protection to the attorney-client privilege in a
relatively easy and cost-effective manner. Although the proponent of the
opinion has noted possible burdens this may place on attorneys, 234 if the
proposed opinion was merely revised to require an attorney to warn his client
230 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413, at
Intro (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fo99-4 13.html.
231 See Messer, supra note 24, at 97.
232 Id. Messer notes that informing the client of the risk that the client might waive
the "privilege would protect the attorney in any subsequent related malpractice actions"
by the client. Id. at 98.
233 Id.
234 Messer discusses three burdens that attorneys would face under this approach.
First, attorneys would have to learn to recognize employer e-mail addresses and refuse to
use them. Second, attorneys would also have to warn their clients about the potential risks
of workplace monitoring. Third, since some clients have only their employer e-mail
addresses, attorneys would have to know where to direct their clients to get secure
personal e-mail addresses. Id. However, in this author's opinion, the burden placed on
attorneys is minimal compared to the value of the enhanced protection it would bring to
the attorney-client privilege.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
of the risks inherent with confidential communications being sent via e-mail,
this would seem to place an extremely minimal burden on attorneys. 235 In
fact, this approach can be harmonized with the ABA Model Rules and does
not appear to overburden attorneys by requiring them to exercise precaution
to simply advise their clients of the dangers that may exist. 236
Therefore, it seems feasible that the ABA could issue an opinion
containing general practice pointers and recommend that attorneys follow
certain precautions when communicating with a client over e-mail. One
author suggests that as workplace monitoring of employee computer use
increases,237  attorneys should exercise additional caution when
communicating with clients, particularly when clients use an employer-
issued computer to e-mail or prepare documents for their attorney.238 The
attorney should investigate whether the client is subject to computer
monitoring, as the existence of employee monitoring should alert attorneys to
a potential waiver of the attorney-client privilege and provide notice to the
attorney that confidentiality dangers may arise. Attorneys should also
consider the employee's awareness and consent to workplace monitoring.239
Attorneys should look to the employer-employee agreement regarding
computer use to assess whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy,240 and in accordance with the current case law, they should take note
235 This approach would effectively eliminate the first and third burdens on
attorneys, and the only duty the attorney would have would be to warn their clients about
the potential risks of workplace monitoring.
236 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2004). This approach is
consistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in several ways. Rule 1.4
governs communication, and it requires that a lawyer shall "reasonably consult with the
client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished" as well as
"explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." Id. Thus, requiring a lawyer to advise his or her
client of the possible dangers of communicating via e-mail from a work computer would
constitute "consulting with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are
to be accomplished," as well as explaining this circumstance of representation "to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation," in accordance with the ABA's requirements under the Model Rules.
See id.
237 See supra Part I for a discussion on the great increase of employer monitoring of
employees.
238 See supra Part I.
239 See supra Part I.
240 The attorney could also make suggestions as to how the employee can increase
his expectation of privacy, such as suggesting that password-protection may serve to
increase expectations of privacy.
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that courts may also consider the enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of the
policy. 241
Employees may not be aware of the dangerous effect workplace
monitoring can have on their confidential communications with their
attorneys. The ABA can easily provide this knowledge to attorneys by
issuing a revised opinion concerning computer usage. In turn, requiring
attorneys to take these additional precautions to help make their clients aware
of the potential dangers of e-mail communications appears to be a feasible
option, consistent with other professional obligations,242 to enhance
employees' knowledge of privacy issues that may arise in the workplace.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the tension between employers' legitimate need to monitor
employees and the importance of both employee privacy and the attorney-
client privilege, where does this leave Ashlee, our sexually harassed
employee, who thought her communication was protected by the attorney-
client privilege?
Courts have come out various ways on traditional privacy rights claims,
and the recent cases involving the attorney-client privilege appear to be
gathering mixed results as well. However, if the approach suggested in this
Note is followed, Ashlee may be able to count on her attorney-client
privilege after all. The court hearing Ashlee's lawsuit could follow the Curto
court's approach. Under the Curto analysis, the court would take into
consideration that Ashlee's employer did not enforce its monitoring policy
and thus find that Ashlee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her e-
mail communications. Alternatively, federal and state legislatures could
enact statutes to protect the privacy of others similarly situated to Ashlee. Or
perhaps Ashlee's attorney should have been required to inform Ashlee of the
possibility that e-mailing from a work computer where there is a computer
monitoring policy may constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In
this case, she may have been more precautious before e-mailing her attorney
from work. If any of these approaches are followed, it is likely that Ashlee
would be able to successfully assert her attorney-client privilege and
withhold the documents from discovery.
An employee communicating with his or her attorney from a work
computer presents a different problem than a traditional Fourth Amendment
or common law invasion of privacy claim. This different context should be
241 See Curto v. Medical World Communications, Inc., No. 03CV6327(DRH)
(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) ("Enforcement is a [r]elevant
[c]onsideration.").
242 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2004).
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considered significant, and courts should follow the Curto court and find that
they are not bound by the traditional expectation of privacy cases in this
unique context. Given the importance of the attorney-client privilege and the
changing technological landscape of modem businesses, courts, legislatures,
and legal scholars should consider enacting stronger protections for
employees who may find themselves in Ashlee's situation. As technology
continues to expand and employees are working from around the globe, it
seems only more likely that the problem Ashlee experienced will continue to
increase. By adhering to any of the proposed solutions in this Note,
employees' rights to privacy and attomey-client privilege can be protected,
even in the face of our current "technological revolution," where computers
are abundant and communication through e-mail is deemed almost necessary.
